In defense of the Supralapsarian position

"Thus it seems to me that the best way to decide upon the order of the decrees is to construe logical order as teleological. God has seen the end from the beginning; he has ordained the temporally prior parts to produce the intended result. If, now, the order of history is the reverse of the order of planning, we get a supralapsarian view which, if 'quite different from that which is commonly discussed in Reformed circles,' as Nicole says, is nonetheless much more consistent and intelligible.
Although my critic acknowledges 'the lucid simplicity of the principle advocated,' he apparently believes that three objections are unanswerable.
The first objection is that 'supralapsarianism does not have a real object for its first and most important decree.' Similarly Charles Hodge (Systematic Theology, II, 318) writes, 'Of a Non Ens, as Turretin says, nothing can be determined.' This assumes a theory of reality that needs some explanation. Nicole says that 'the decree of creation is the indispensable prerequisite for viewing any creature as real. 'There is some plausibility for connecting creation creation itself with the reality of creatures, but I am not sure that a decree of creation without its execution gives a reality sufficient to overthrow God's purpose, plan, and intention.
If, however, one does not want to decide this point on the spur of the moment, its execution gives the kind of reality that would satisfy the writers mentioned. For if it is true that 'Of a Non Ens nothing can be determined,' then a determination to create is impossible, just as impossible as a determination to glorify. In other words, if the decree to create is put first on these grounds, the yet to be created object could be viewed neither as righteous nor as sinful, nor even as a man, for nothing can be determined of what is yet a Non Ens. This line of argument seems to make it impossible for God to have a purpose, plan, or intention. For, if the decree of election, put first, cannot envisage a created reality, similarly a decree to create cannot envisage a redeemed sinner. Thus God would decree to create without plan or intention. He would not see the end from the beginning, but only from three steps after the beginning.
Hodge, in fact, makes a sort of denial that God plans all events in view of his final end. He says, 'Creation in the Bible is never represented as a means of executing the purpose of election and reprobation.' If this were so, then either creation has no purpose at all, or God's purposes are not completely integrated - that is, creation may have some purpose, but whatever it is, it is not related to the final consummation. It seems to me that the Biblical descriptions of God, his omniscience and omnipotence, imply a complete teleology, without any disconnectedness or rupture. Hodge himself admits this on page 320. Indeed he states it emphatically. But he fails to see how God's 'one comprehensive purpose' ruins his argument against supralapsarianism." - Gordon H. Clark, Reply to Roger Nicole