"What is sometimes given as the definition of philosophical Necessity, namely, 'That by which a thing cannot but be,' or 'whereby it cannot be otherwise,' fails of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts: First, the words can, or cannot, need explanation as much as the word Necessity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when we say, a thing cannot but be, we might explain ourselves by saying, it must necessarily be so; as well as explain Necessity, by saying, it is that by which a thing cannot but be. And Secondly, this definition is liable to the fore-mentioned great inconvenience; the words cannot, or unable, are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the thing spoken of; to which as I have now observed, the word Necessity, as used by philosophers, has no reference.
Philosophical Necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connexion between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something to be true. When there is such a connexion then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a philosophical sense; whether any opposition or contrary effort be supposed, or no. When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and certain connexion, then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word necessity, in the following discourse, when I endeavor to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty." - Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Pg. 16 -17
Showing posts with label Jonathan Edwards. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jonathan Edwards. Show all posts
Thursday, October 8, 2015
The will acts on what is most pleasing or agreeable
"But possibly it is needless to mention the 'state of the mind,' as a grounds of the agreeableness of objects distinct from the other two mentioned before; viz. The apparent nature and circumstances of the objects viewed, and the manner of the view. Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter, the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeableness of objects, any other way, than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and, as it occasions the manner of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively.
However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained. The choice of the mind never departs from that which, at the time, and with respect to the direct and immediate objects of decision, appears most agreeable and pleasing all things considered. If the immediate objects of the Will are a man's own actions, then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all things considered, to walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then he chooses to speak; if it suits him best to keep silence, then he chooses to keep silence. There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them. To say, that they do what pleases them, but yet not what is agreeable to them, is the same thing as to say, they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say, that they do what they please and yet do not what they please." - Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Pg. 14
However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained. The choice of the mind never departs from that which, at the time, and with respect to the direct and immediate objects of decision, appears most agreeable and pleasing all things considered. If the immediate objects of the Will are a man's own actions, then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all things considered, to walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then he chooses to speak; if it suits him best to keep silence, then he chooses to keep silence. There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them. To say, that they do what pleases them, but yet not what is agreeable to them, is the same thing as to say, they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say, that they do what they please and yet do not what they please." - Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Pg. 14
What determines the will?
Jonathan Edwards, "With respect to that grand inquiry, 'What determines the Will? it would be very tedious and unnecessary, at present, to examine all the various opinions, which have been advanced concerning this matter; nor is it needful that I should enter into a particular discussion of all points debated in disputes on that other question, 'Whether the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding?' It is sufficient to my present purpose to say, It is that motive, which, as it stands in view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the Will." Freedom of the Will, Pg. 9
This reminds me of what Gordon Clark says in Religion, Revelation and Reason
Clark says, "The primacy of the intellect, then, cannot be a power automatically exercised over the volition regarded as a separate faculty. This would violate the unity of the person. Instead of the phrase 'THE PRIMACY OF THE INTELLECT', the essential idea might better be expressed as 'THE PRIMACY OF THE TRUTH'. And the primacy is one of authority rather than of psychological power. The older forms of expression generate an old perplexity dating from Platonic dialogues. On the assumption that the intellect dominates the will, it would follow that no one does wrong knowingly. All evil is due to ignorance, and education guarantees correct conduct. The ambiguities hidden in this apparently simple language are enormous. But if we speak of the primacy of truth, we can avoid, even if we do not solve, these perplexities. The primacy of truth will mean that our voluntary actions ought to conform to the truth. Obviously sometimes they do not. If it is true that worshiping God is good, we ought to worship him. Perhaps we choose not to worship God, but the truth is superior in right to our will. This way of putting the matter extends as well to the voluntary choice of belief. We may choose to believe a truth, or we may choose to believe a lie. Both types of choice actually occur. But the primacy of truth means that we ought to believe the truth and we ought not to believe the lie." - Emphasis is mine. Found in his Three R's
This reminds me of what Gordon Clark says in Religion, Revelation and Reason
Clark says, "The primacy of the intellect, then, cannot be a power automatically exercised over the volition regarded as a separate faculty. This would violate the unity of the person. Instead of the phrase 'THE PRIMACY OF THE INTELLECT', the essential idea might better be expressed as 'THE PRIMACY OF THE TRUTH'. And the primacy is one of authority rather than of psychological power. The older forms of expression generate an old perplexity dating from Platonic dialogues. On the assumption that the intellect dominates the will, it would follow that no one does wrong knowingly. All evil is due to ignorance, and education guarantees correct conduct. The ambiguities hidden in this apparently simple language are enormous. But if we speak of the primacy of truth, we can avoid, even if we do not solve, these perplexities. The primacy of truth will mean that our voluntary actions ought to conform to the truth. Obviously sometimes they do not. If it is true that worshiping God is good, we ought to worship him. Perhaps we choose not to worship God, but the truth is superior in right to our will. This way of putting the matter extends as well to the voluntary choice of belief. We may choose to believe a truth, or we may choose to believe a lie. Both types of choice actually occur. But the primacy of truth means that we ought to believe the truth and we ought not to believe the lie." - Emphasis is mine. Found in his Three R's
Saturday, December 18, 2010
The Wisdome of God in Salvation
Jonathan Edwards says that Christ was the perfect Substitute. "For He was The Devine Son of God who was incarnated as a Man lived the perfect righteous life that no one else could live and died sinlessly (in obedience) on the Cross. Christ was perfect, because God had decreed that all things display his glory - his being (Each person of the trinity is seen in salvation) and his attributes and his sovereignty over not only the angels, but the demons. Thereby procuring on behalf of certain sinners peace with God and thus recieving favor for them so that they may find satisfying happiness in Him and so enjoy Him forever and through this believers are given every sort of good in Christ. What this means then is that God's dishonor is made for His glory, and God's attributes ordered sinful Man's destruction and also Salvation calls Sinners to repent and turn to Christ in faith. There is still hope for those who hear these words and repent and trust in Christ for righteousness alone. Ephesians 3:10"
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